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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
man's last and usual place of abode is his present usual place of abode.
This ruling was assailed in a federal court case30 but never expressly
overruled. Then in the Caskey v. Peterson case,31 the court held that
the usual place of abode of an emancipated boy who was working on
and living at a farm away from his parents was at the farm and not
at his present home. This decision interpreted the Wisconsin statute32
on substituted service and seemed to follow the Earle v. McVeigh rule33
that the usual place of abode is the place where the defendant is usually
and actually living. However, Wisconsin rulings43 differ from the Rowe
case rulings35 in that Wisconsin has held that all statutes on substi-
tuted service should be strictly construed.
The writer believes that the Ingerton case is an unnecessary en-
largement of the temporary residence doctrine of earlier federal court
cases. While its doctrine of liberal construction is not available under
the facts in the Ingerton case as such, the policy of the decision of the
Rowe case and the reasoning of the dissenting judge appear to this
writer to be the sounder view on this problem and would be more in
keeping with the other federal decisions on this question.,
DONALD GRIFFIN, JR.
Property-Commission for Sale of Farm after Listing Contract
Has Expired-The plaintiff, Butterworth, an agefit for the United
Farm Agency, in pursuance of his listing agreement for the property,
offered to lease the farm for a year with an option to buy during the
year. This arrangement was acceptable to defendants and plaintiff
ceased all efforts to find a purchaser. Five months after the brokerage
contract expired, but during the life of the option, Mrs. Harrison per-
suaded one Vanadore to exercise his option and purchase the farm at
the original price of $12,500. Agent now sues for his 10% commission.
HELD: the defendants, by executing a sales contract with Vanadore
(the purchaser produced by plaintiff) before the lease option contract
had expired, in effect agreed to an extension of the listing agreement
since it is clear that the lease option contract was a direct result of the
listing agreement which Mrs. Harrison signed. justice McFadden in
his dissent claims that the broker is not entitled to any commission in
this case because: (a) the sale was not made within the time stated
30 Swift v. Meyers, 37 Fed. 37 (1888).
31 Cashey v. Peterson, 220 Wis. 690, 263 N.W. 658 (1935).3 2 WIs. STATS. (1951) §262.08 (4).
33 Supra, n. 4.
4 Pollard v. Wegener, 13 Wis. *569 (1860), Mechlem v. Blake, 19 Wis. *397
(1865).35 Supra, n. 9.
36 But see; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and
34 MARQ. L. REv. 120.
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in the brokerage contract; (b) no bad faith is involved here; and (c)
the owners did no act to extend or waive the time limit set out in the
broker's contract of employment. Harrison et al v. United Farm
Agency, 262 S.W. 2d 293 (1953).
In this case there are three grounds upon which recovery might
be predicated: (1) express contract; (2) contracts implied in fact; or
(3) quasi-contracts. There can be no recovery under an express con-
tract since the written contract expired five months before the owner
sold the land.1 Thus the written contract was ended and if plaintiff is
going to recover he will have to show either that a new hiring can be
implied from the facts of the case or that the defendant has been un-
justly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.
Contracts implied in fact consist of obligations arising from mutual
agreement and intent to promise where, the agreement and promise
have not been expressed in words.2 In order to create an implied con-
tract facts and circumstances must be shown from which a hiring can
be implied. In order to give rise to such an implication it must appear
that the plaintiff was rendering service on behalf of the defendant
with his knowledge and consent.3 In this case the plaintiff agency
exerted no efforts whatsoever after the expiration of the listing agree-
ment, and what the plaintiff did previously was done in reliance upon
the written listing agreement which has since become a dead letter.
The fact that the broker rendered, these services without compensa-
tion is irrelevant when we consider that the broker is paid on the
basis of his results and not on the amount of 'effort expended.4 Cer-
tainly the plaintiff has not been damaged in any way. He did not pro-
duce a buyer within his contract time, and therefore, he is not being
paid for producing one. After the written contract had lapsed, there
was no further contract between plaintiff-broker and defendant. There-
fore, upon what grounds could a contract be implied in fact?
Justice McFadden in pointing out the folly of implying a contract
under these facts says:
"In allowing the broker to recover-in this case, the majority of
this court is saying that if a broker, who has a time limit for
completing a sale, can inveigle the owner into leasing the prop-
erty for any length of time under a contract containing an op-
tion for the lessee to buy, then the landowner must pay the
broker the commission on the sale if the lessee ever exercises
the option."
So far we have considered this problem only in light of the com-
I Nordale Realty Co. v. Havel, 251 Wis. 136, 28 N.W. 2d 245 (1947) ; 2 CJ.S.
Brokers, §88,
21 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS 9 (1936).3 Hug v. Theilacker, 192 Wis. 330, 212 N.W. 671 (1927).
4 Estate of Keyser, 190 Wis. 189, 206 N.W. 895 (1926).
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mon law. Arkansas has no statute which requires all listing or brok-
erage contracts to be in writing,5 but Wisconsin Statutes (1949)
§240.10 does set up such a requirement. Could an extension of a writ-
ten listing agreement be implied -by the facts and circumstances of the
case in Wisconsin? The Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared in
1947, in a case also involving an implied extension of a prior written
listing agreement :6
"Section 240.10 Stats. provides that every contract to pay a
commission to a real estate broker is void unless in writing.
Under this statute there is no room for a so-called implied con-
tract."
There is one last ray of hope accorded the real estate agent. Can
he convince the court that the demands of justice necessitate imply-
ing a contract here as a matter of law? If a quasi-contractual rela-
tionship could be imposed there need be no reference to the inten-
tions of the parties.7 All of the courts at one time or another have en-
forced contracts, even when they were void under the statute of
frauds, on the theory that the defendant is being unjustly enriched
at the expense of the innocent plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff is
allowed to recover the reasonable value of his services. In this case
the plaintiff performed no services for which compensation was not
provided had the results been attained with the provisions of the con-
tract. Had the agent personally completed the sale there might be a
different result. Even then, though, he would be subject to the ac-
cusation that he was a mere volunteer and nothing more. By how much
then have the plaintiff's actions enriched the defendants?
The problem is much simpler in states that have statutes which re-
quire such contracts to be in writing. In fact there is no problem. The
legislative intent of this statute is to protect the owner of real estate
from the unfounded claims of real estate agents and now and then to
protect the agent from being cheated out of 'his commission. If the
court, under such a statute, would allow recovery on quantum meruit
it would in effect be nullifying the law as laid down by the legislature.
The court therefore laid down this rule in Hale v. Krisel:8
"To hold that there can be recovery upon quantum meruit is
to open the door to the very abuses the statute (240.10) was en-
acted to prevent and defeat its manifest purpose."
In conclusion the dissenting opinion of Justice McFadden seems
to be by far the more logical solution to the question under common
law, and under existing Wisconsin Law it is the only answer.
PATRICK H. BRIGDEN
5 See Kempner v. Gans, 87 Ark. 221, 111 S.W. 1123 (1908) ; Vanemurg v. Duffy,
177 Ark. 663, 7 S.W. 2d 336 (1928).6 Leuch v. Campbell, 250 Wis. 272, 26 N.W. 2d 538 (1947).
7 1 WILUSTON, CONTACTS 9 (1936).
8 194 Wis. 271, 215 N.W. 227.
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